

VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEK #0293/01 0870902
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 270902Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0846

S E C R E T BISHKEK 000293

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ACTION OF OIG
DEPT FOR NEA/SCA/EX BILL HAUGH
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN DAVID GEHRENBECK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2033
TAGS: [AMGT](#) [ASEC](#) [ASIG](#) [AISG](#)
SUBJECT: EMBASSY BISHKEK RESPONSES TO RECOMMENDATIONS
LISTED IN OIG REPORT NUMBER ISP-S-08-14A, FEBRUARY 2008

REF: A. MCCORMICK/AMBASSADOR YOVANOVITCH E-MAIL DATED
FEBRUARY 29 2008
[1](#)B. OIG REPORT NUMBER ISP-S-08-14A FEBRUARY 2008

Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger for Reasons 1.4(g)

Here follows Embassy Bishkek responses to the formal and
informal recommendations listed in OIG report number
ISP-S-08-14A.

[1](#)1. (C/NF) Recommendation 1: Embassy Bishkek should continue
to coordinate with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations to ensure near term installation of locally
fabricated mantraps for the vehicle entrances to the embassy
compound.
(Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with OBO)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post has contracted via RPSO Frankfurt with a
German Architectural and Engineering firm to provide 100%
design and construction documents for the Mantrap project. To
date, Post and OBO have received the 35% design submittal for
review and have returned comments. Although most recently
some contractual problems have slowed the design effort, Post
is confident these issues will be resolved quickly and 100%
design documents can be delivered by 30 April. After
receiving the final construction documents and OBO Building
Permit, Post will proceed to the contracting and construction
phase.

[1](#)2. (C/NF) Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Overseas
Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek,
should replace the damaged forced-entry/ballistic-resistant
window on the compound access control guard booth servicing
the employee parking lot. (Action: OBO, in coordination with
Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post identified the proper replacement glass and
ordered the glass directly from Norshield in coordination
with OBO/PE/CC/SPE via purchases order SKG-100-08-M-0057. The
order for the replacement glass was placed on 01/17/08. On
03/05/08, Post learned that the window reached our dispatch
agent in New Jersey. Post anticipates the window will arrive
06/08. Once the replacement glass is received, Post will
coordinate with Larry Best and Koburn Stoll from
OBO/PE/CC/SPE to request an FE/BR door and window team for
installation.

[1](#)3. (SBU) Recommendation 3: Embassy Bishkek should implement
flexible work hours for embassy personnel and encourage

employees to vary their arrival and departure times. (Action: Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs in part.

Response: Post is not prepared to implement flexible working hours Embassy wide, but prefers a stepped approach to arrival times by section to help alleviate vehicles waiting outside of the compound to be screened, which is a the security concern that prompted this recommendation. Post has analyzed the congestion problems and contends that the congestion is primarily focused at Post 26 (vehicle CAC) from between 0800 to 0830 while vehicles are waiting for security screening. Post Management has instructed the Facilities Maintenance Section to alter their working hours so that this section would start work at 0800 vice 0830. The Facilities Maintenance Section is by far the largest section that reports directly to the Embassy every morning and modifying their arrival time by 30 minutes should eliminate waiting lines for security screening while still maintaining positive management controls over staff. In addition, the RSO regularly advises all American Staff to vary their routes and times to and from work.

¶4. (C/NF) Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should assess the integrity of all affected chancery windows and advise the embassy of any needed work to bring the windows into compliance with security standards. (Action: OBO)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Yvonne Manderville from OBO/PE/DE/SEB visited Post in March 2008. Manderville stated that adhesive properties of the gasket material have failed and caused the gasket to

separate from the window pane which has resulted in the degradation of the ballistic properties of the window assemblies. Manderville recommended that Post petition for inclusion in the FE/BR window and door replacement program. Post is drafting a cable to OBO and DS requesting a formal condition survey of all FE/BR windows and doors. In this cable Post will also petition for inclusion in the Life Cycle Replacement program. Request will be submitted by May 1, 2008.

¶5. (S/NF) Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should conduct a complete TEMPEST review of all permanent and temporary classified processing areas at post and provide detailed instructions regarding countermeasures that should be employed to mitigate any proven TEMPEST noncompliance or threat. (Action: DS in coordination with Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post will review and implement the recommendations from the May 2007 Technical Security Assessment. Post has contacted Lee Mason and Mark Steakley from DS/ST/CMP/ECB to request and schedule a TEMPEST review. Mason and Steakley were contacted in mid March and Post is waiting follow-up and confirmation.

¶6. (SBU) Recommendation 6: Embassy Bishkek should establish a viable alternate command center. (Action: Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post does not concur.

Response: The current alternate command center represents the best option presently available to Embassy Bishkek. The alternate command center is located south of Bishkek not far from the Kyrgyz Presidential mansion and the Diplomatic village. While the road infrastructure could be improved, the location is not remote. In addition, the location is well suited for a helicopter landing zone. There is a large field approximately 600 meters wide and 2 kilometers in length that could accommodate several transport helicopters in the event of an evacuation. The alternate command center has a HF radio base station that when last tested in December 2007 had

excellent link quality between Embassy Dushanbe (82%) and Embassy Tashkent (91%). The alternate command center has two computer workstations with dial-up internet access, a photocopier, and a fax. There are two landlines, one IVG line and two satellite phones. The alternate command center can be placed into operation within 30 minutes as demonstrated in a test in December 2007. Furthermore, the location has been fully stocked with medical supplies, emergency rations and water. Embassy Bishkek could not find any blast protection requirements in the applicable Alternate Command Center references in 12 FAH-1 H-261c and 12 FAH 1, Appendix 3. As the Post housing pool evolves, Post will continue to seek a better Alternate Command Center, but the current location is the best option at the present time.

17. (SBU) Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should evaluate post's current safe haven and initiate a physical security upgrade project to bring the safe haven into conformance with current requirements. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post's safe haven area is too small to protect all employees assigned to Embassy Bishkek. Until the annex is built, Post initiated coordination with Yvonne Manderville OBO/PE/DE/SEB and Dale Amdahl DS/PCB/PSD to identify and implement viable alternatives such as constructing safe areas in the warehouse, facilities maintenance building and health unit/caf. Post's floor warden training addresses refuge locations within the Chancery.

18. (SBU) Recommendation 8: Embassy Bishkek should develop and implement a formal agreement with Manas Air Base for the evacuation of Americans and qualifying locally employed staff members. (Action: Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: The Embassy has explored the recommendation. In doing so we have learned that a formal agreement between Embassy Bishkek and Manas Coalition Airbase for the evacuation of Americans and qualifying locally employed staff members and selected foreign nationals, is not necessary to ensure Noncombatant Evacuation Operations are accomplished,

and the base is not authorized by USCENTCOM to conclude such an agreement. There are mechanisms in place for the efficient and proper coordination and planning for this contingency which should be followed to ensure forces and assets are available during emergency situations. Embassy Bishkek has therefore coordinated with USCENTCOM to ensure contingency planning options are in-place, to include evacuation of Embassy personnel, and fully coordinated with other affected agencies (USTRANSCOM, DOS, and JCS) IAW applicable directives.

19. (SBU) Recommendation 9: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should conduct a security assessment to determine whether static residential guards are required in addition to the centralized alarm monitoring system and mobile patrol. (Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with DS)

Management decision: Post concurs, with comment.

Response: Post will conduct, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic security an assessment outlined in 12 FAH-6 H-521.1. Post is confident the assessment will reaffirm that the residential security program is necessary for the safety and security of personnel assigned to Embassy Bishkek. Targeted date for completion is 30 June 2008.

The greatest threat against Americans in Bishkek is crime. In February 1994 Embassy Bishkek instructed the Local Guard Commander to implement a night residential security program. In October 2002, the RSO identified a local alarm company

that had the technical capability to install and monitor alarms and panic buttons at Embassy residences. However, in January 2008 the new Minister of Internal Affairs announced that MVD would no longer provide a quick reaction force to respond to alarms. In addition, RSO Bishkek is only authorized one, 24 hour mobile patrol. This means that response time to residences in the event of an emergency is too slow. Although the distance between the southernmost and northernmost residence is only 8 miles, the infrastructure and traffic can delay response time by more than 30 minutes. In addition, Mobile Patrol can only check each residence two or three times in a 12 hour shift. This situation is untenable.

Since 2006, residential LGF have detected and deterred 4 instances of attempted vandalism to Embassy employee vehicles at their residences. LGF residential guards have deterred assault and when tasked provided temporary 24 hour residential security for American Officers who the RSO had reason to believe were being threatened by host nation intelligence and or organized crime. Finally, residential security guards were able to monitor and report regarding an incident in which a vehicle belonging to the son-in-law of the former deputy chief of the Kyrgyz Intelligence service was deliberately torched within 30 feet of an apartment building which, at the time, housed four Embassy employees and their families. Since the Embassy began using the alarm company, the Police have not had to respond to incidents at residences during the night when the guards were present. The alarms have only been needed during the day when the guards are not present. The statistic speaks for itself. The residential guards are a definite deterrent against acts of violence and vandalism against American Officers. Embassy Bishkek, if required to choose between residential alarms and residential guards, would choose to maintain the residential guards, as a more viable means of protecting the lives of the American officers and their dependents.

¶10. (C/NF) Recommendation 10: Embassy Bishkek should install shatter-resistant window film on all windows that the regional security officer considers vulnerable at the chief of mission residence. (Action: Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post's Facilities Maintenance Section has scheduled a survey of the CMR to identify all windows that are not currently protected by shatter-resistant window film. Post currently has film on hand and will contract with a local contractor for installation. Targeted date of completion is May 31, 2008.

¶11. (SBU) Recommendation 11: Embassy Bishkek should install grilles on all accessible windows in the chief of mission residence safe area and fit one window grille with an interior emergency release device for emergency egress. (Action: Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: RSO in conjunction with the FM at Post has scheduled a review and update of the existing physical security assessment of the CMR in accordance with residential security standards 12 FAH-6 H-400, 12 FAH-6 H-113.10 and 12 FAH-8 H-520. Any deficiencies discovered during this review will be corrected to conform to the standards. Targeted date of completion is July 31, 2008.

¶12. (U) Recommendation 12: Embassy Bishkek should pursue and secure a formal agreement with Manas Air force Base, including reimbursement, for investigative support provided by the regional security office. (Action: Embassy Bishkek)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post FMO has contacted Manas Air Base Chief Financial Officer regarding this recommendation and has

requested a meeting to explore the concept of reimbursement for investigative services provided by the Embassy on behalf of Manas Air Base. Post RSO and FMO are working closely to accurately identify and quantify associated cost related to investigations. Once Post's analysis is complete the FMO will coordinate with Manas Air Base Chief Finance Officer to establish a formal agreement that outlines workload counts and a reimbursement plan for investigations completed by RSO Foreign Service National Investigators on behalf of Manas Air Base.

¶13. (C/NF) Recommendation 13: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with the Bureaus of Overseas Buildings Operations and Diplomatic Security, should modify the facility manager's existing office space to bring it into compliance with current physical security protection standards. (Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with OBO and DS)

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Although Post concurs with this recommendation, a short term solution is unlikely. The existing Facilities Managers Office is a loft in the Maintenance Shop Building. This building is a pre-engineered building (Butler Building) and is physically unable to handle the load that would be applied to the structure by the addition of making this area compliant with current physical security protection standards. Post has been actively pursuing with OBO a new office annex (NOX), which is a long term solution to holistically address all of our space and space related security concerns. Post is currently on the "Top 80 List" for 2011 and a back-up for 2010. However, Embassy Bishkek Facilities Maintenance Officer and the Regional Security Officer will prepare a waiver and exception package for DS/PSD/PCB review and approval. Targeted date for submission of the waiver and exception request to DS/PSD/PCB is June 2008.

¶14. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 1: The inner CAC building (post two) lacks any form of protective window treatment on its windows. Occupants are susceptible to flying glass if a bomb attack occurred on the east side of the compound. Embassy Bishkek should install shatter-resistant window film on all post two windows that the regional security officer deems vulnerable to blast.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: Post's Facilities Maintenance Section will conduct a survey of Post 2 and identify all windows that are not currently protected by shatter-resistant window film. Post currently has film on hand and will contract with a local contractor for installation. Targeted date of completion is May 31, 2008.

¶15. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 2: The presence of a concrete barrier adjacent to the east side vehicular CAC, a large boulder adjacent to the northwest corner of the compound wall, and a stoplight fixture adjacent to the service CAC provide footholds that an intruder could use to scale the compound wall. Embassy Bishkek should remove or relocate the concrete barrier, boulder, and stoplight that are adjacent to the embassy compound fence.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: In March Post relocated the concrete barriers and large boulders so that they are at least 2.75 meters from the compound wall and can no longer be used as a foothold. The location of the stoplight fixture will be relocated during the construction of the mantrap for that CAC later this year.

¶16. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 3: The rear hardline door leading to the temporary trailers is not covered by an exterior camera. The Marine at Post One cannot positively determine who he is letting into the chancery. Without

a camera, he could either allow an intruder to enter or deny entry to a trusted employee in an emergency. Embassy Bishkek should install a camera to cover this area.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: The regional ESO from Astana concurs with this recommendation; ESO will relocate camera #28 so that it provides video coverage of this entrance to the Chancery. Additional materials required for this project are on-hand and this project has been added to the active work list as a priority. Targeted completion date is June 30th

¶17. (SBU) Informal Recommendation 4: The emergency plan for Embassy Bishkek has not been entered into the crisis and emergency planning application. Embassy Bishkek should direct section heads to input the missing data before February 2008.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: In February Post completed the unclassified portion of the EAP and entered it into the crisis and emergency planning application. Post is waiting for DS/IP/SPC/EP to advise that the software glitch has been fixed to allow Post to publish the classified sections as well.

¶18. (SBU) Informal Recommendation 5: The emergency notification system does not cover the embassy's built-in conference room or the workspace just outside the two CAA temporary office trailers. Embassy Bishkek should install speaker systems at these two locations.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: The regional ESO from Astana concurs with this recommendation; additional speakers and other materials required for this project are on-hand and this project has been added to the active work list as a priority. Targeted completion date is June 30th.

¶19. (SBU) Informal Recommendation 6: The physical security exceptions for three locations within the compound are not valid. Embassy Bishkek should update the existing physical security exceptions for the medical unit, cafeteria, and CAA office trailers.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: The waiver for exceptions to physical security standards for the CAA office trailer is valid. However, the Health Unit/Caf waiver is no longer valid. As a result of post growth, the Health Unit and Cafeteria are now staffed by employees more than 4 hours per day. Embassy Bishkek will resubmit a waiver and exception packet for the health unit/cafeteria. Targeted submission date is 30 June.

¶20. (U) Informal Recommendation 7: Several apartment stairwells do not have lighting at night. Embassy Bishkek should explore gaining landlord agreement to install motion activated lights in stairwells and issue flashlights to employees in the interim.

Management decision: Post does not concur.

Response: Post has conducted an informal survey of all direct hire American staff who receive Embassy provide housing and other than individual incidents of actual light bulbs being burned out, all stairwells have adequate lighting installed. In addition to this, every Friday, the Facilities Maintenance Section Electricians in conjunction with the Local Guard Force make inspections of existing security lighting. Lights are tested in guard booths and stairwells and any maintenance work orders that have been submitted citing security lighting issues are repaired at this time.

¶21. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 8: The grilles on the CMR rear doors do not have latches and cannot be secured from inside the residence. Embassy Bishkek should secure these

grilles.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: RSO in conjunction with the FM at Post will review and update the existing physical security assessment of the CMR in accordance with residential security standards 12 FAH-6 H-400, 12 FAH-6 H-113.10 and 12 FAH-8 H-520. Any deficiencies discovered during this review will be corrected to conform to the standards. Expected completion date is 1 May 2008.

¶22. (C/NF) Informal Recommendation 9: The passive infrared sensor in the living room of the CMR on the rear of the building is inoperative. Embassy Bishkek should repair this infrared sensor.

Management decision: Post concurs.

Response: The local security company that installs and maintains all of our residential alarm systems visited the CMR on March 19, 2008. The entire alarm system was inspected and tested. It was found that some faulty wiring was causing the infrared sensor from operating properly, wiring was repaired and a complete operational test was conducted with satisfactory results.

YOVANOVITCH